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Increased equity participation by employees has attracted substantial interest for its
potential to affect both economic outcomes (e.g., worker and firm performance) and social
outcomes (e.g., wealth and income inequality). This paper summarizes the findings from
over 50 large-sample empirical studies that have been done on employee ownership and
broad-based stock option plans in the past 25 years, covering studies on plan adoption,
employee attitudes and behaviours, firm performance, and employee wages and wealth.
The results from these studies indicate employee ownership is linked to better outcomes on
average but employee ownership clearly does not automatically improve worker and firm
outcomes given that there are both positive and neutral findings. Additional research is
needed to determine the conditions under which employee ownership improves economic
outcomes, to examine worker and employer concerns and the trade-offs they are willing to
make, and to explore the further potential of these systems.
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1. Introduction
There is considerable focus at the moment on equity ownership. According to a recent
article in The Economist1 currently, over 50 per cent of the adult population in the USA
own equity. This is a 100 per cent increase since the time of the market correction in 1987.
Equity ownership is not only a growing phenomenon in the USA but is also occurring
worldwide. Greater than 50 per cent of Australian’s own shares, 20 per cent of Germans
and equity ownership is growing in virtually every major western country.2
Equity ownership, either in the form of stocks or property, plant, and equipment, has
always been an important element of the wealth of the upper income populations of
Western societies. However, the recent developments in the rise of equity ownership
appear in the context of four major developments. First, equity markets have grown as a
way of raising funds and have prospered in this period as a result of general business
expansion, the rise of world capital markets, and the wide diffusion of information
technology in financial markets.
Second, among western nations, and this has been very clear-cut in the USA, there has
been a decline in the ability of the average worker to increase their standard of living solely
through wage increases adjusted for inflation. These increases have been generally flat or
within conservative ranges since 1980, while increases in pension benefits and social
security benefits have been very modest. Companies have increasingly offered the average
worker equities partly as a response to this reality. Sometimes companies simply
supplement wages with equity compensation; other times companies reduce fixed wages
and benefits and trade these reductions for equity. As a result of the fact that fixed state
pension schemes can no longer deliver retirement income security, some governments have
created various pension savings schemes that private companies can offer and many of
these—such as the widely imitated US 401k plan—hold employer stock.
Third, governments, in Western Europe, Latin America, and transitional economies, have
used privatization of state assets as a way to jump-start their public stock markets.
Virtually all of these cases have included some form of broad worker equity. While this
has led to wide variations in terms of success, it has popularized the stock market in some
of these countries. Fourth, the rise of high technology companies, in an atmosphere of tight
labour markets for skilled labour, has led to a move to expand equity incentives for these
knowledge workers.
In the last few years, public policy discussions in the European Union, Latin America, and
Asia, have included soul searching discussions about whether conservatism in their
property sharing and equity participation regimes has served as a moderating influence on
their ability to nurture high technology sectors. Certainly, one of the problems associated
with any examination of shared property ownership by employees and any objective
1 The Economist, March 10
th, 2001: 17.
2 Given the variation in the form and function of employee ownership between countries and a
corresponding quantity of research in each country our focus will largely be on the USA.2
assessment of the research literature is that so many different manifestations of employee
ownership have emerged in the two decades. While there has been substantial expansion of
employee ownership in the past several decades, the past decade has also seen growth in
the use of broad-based stock option plans. While employees do not directly own shares as
with employee ownership plans, broad-based stock option plans are similar in that they
represent an employee equity stake in the company, where employee compensation is tied
to the firm's stock price and employees are likely to develop greater interest in firm
performance.
What are the lessons from the accumulated evidence on employee equity stakes in
companies? Do they improve outcomes for workers and firms, or does the evidence
confirm the views of detractors who point to excessive worker risk and other possible
dangers? While no economies have been fundamentally structured around employee
ownership, many western industrialized economies have a substantial share of firms
embodying these concepts in some form, and a number of transition economies are
experimenting with employee ownership. This has provided the basis for over 50 empirical
studies on the causes and consequences of employee ownership. This paper provides an
overview of evidence on employee ownership and broad-based stock options, and a
discussion of further research needs. Following an overview of relevant economic theory
in Section 2, the incidence, company characteristics, and determinants are reviewed in
Section 3. Section 4 covers evidence on firm performance (profitability, productivity, firm
survival, and employment stability), Section 5 covers evidence on employee attitudes and
behaviour, and Section 6 provides conclusions.
As will be seen, one broad generalization from the many studies is that employee
ownership and broad-based stock options do not automatically improve outcomes for
workers or firms. A second generalization, though, is that these policies are more often
associated with better outcomes than with worse outcomes. This broadly supports a case
that there may be benefits—and are unlikely to be adverse consequences—from the
expansion of employee equity stakes in companies, although clearly the results cannot be
pre-ordained and depend on a variety of factors. In addition, the findings create a strong
case for further research in this area, to provide better insights into the conditions




Many advocates of employee ownership have focused on how they can serve as collective
incentives to improve workplace co-operation and performance. This is founded most
basically on the idea that worker motivation is improved by giving workers a direct stake
in outcomes, through tying compensation and/or wealth more closely to worker
performance. While there are a variety of ways in which employers can try to ensure
optimum performance of workers (e.g., close supervision, piece rates, deferred
compensation, efficiency wages), collective incentives can complement or substitute for
these methods under certain conditions. Piece rates, for example, may be difficult to
implement and discourage innovation and co-operation, and centralized monitoring may be3
more costly and less effective than ‘horizontal monitoring’ done by co-workers
(Nalbantian, 1987). This may be especially true in current modular team production
settings (Applebaum and Berg, 2000).
A theoretical objection to the positive productivity effects of employee ownership concerns
managerial incentives to supervise workers. The objection is that, by decreasing the share
of economic surplus going to owners, the owners (and their agents, the managers) will
have weaker incentives for effective monitoring of workers, leading to lower performance
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). This argument relies on several assumptions, including that
there are no principal-agent problems between owners and managers, and that the decrease in
monitoring by management will not be accompanied by an increase in workers monitoring
each other. Putterman and Skillman (1988) note that the argument is based on ‘incentives to
monitor but not on the ability to observe accurately’, and such decreased ability can offset
the theorized higher incentives for management monitoring. Nalbantian points out that
Employees engaged in the routine day-to-day fulfillment of a task are usually in a
position to detect inefficiencies in operations that diminish productivity. They are
also likely to acquire important information concerning the actual productive
contributions of their co-workers... The information derived from such activity...is
potentially very valuable to the firm as an input to production. Yet such information
transfers will not be induced under an individual performance-based rewards system
since it does not affect his own performance measures…
But under the group system, the appropriate incentives are much more likely to be
present. If there are indeed positive externalities associated with these information
inputs and all the relevant group members are subject to the same incentives, then
there is reason for the employee to identify his own interests with those of the firm
and to furnish the inputs requisite to the firm's success (1987: 26).
In analyzing the theory that optimal monitoring requires concentrated residual rights,
Putterman and Skillman conclude that ‘closing the story which says that a particular
assignment of residual rights will best elicit the desired monitoring effort remains a
difficult challenge, especially if monitoring is itself difficult to observe and there are
reasons why the monitor or monitors might want to misrepresent their information’ (1988:
118). It is possible for management monitoring costs to be lower in employee owned or
firms with shared ownership if employees have a consensus to monitor each other and are
more willing to share information with the company.
The efficiency of employee ownership arrangements is also questioned by Hansmann
(1996). He argues that collective action problems arise in any enterprise that is jointly
owned by multiple individuals, and governance arrangements will be more efficient if
control rights are limited to a single class of individuals with fairly homogeneous interests.
This generally favours ownership by financial investors, since they have a common interest
in the highest profits, but he notes that ‘in practice it appears that, when the employees
involved are highly homogeneous, employee ownership is more efficient than investor
ownership.’ With a heterogeneous workforce, however, he says that ‘direct employee
control of the firm brings substantial costs—costs that are generally large enough to
outweigh the benefits that employee ownership otherwise offers’ (1996: 119).4
One of the often cited drawbacks of group incentive schemes is that the connection
between individual performance and reward grows weaker as the number of covered
employees grows larger. This is commonly referred to as the ‘1/N problem’: with N
employees in a company, each employee will get on average only 1/N of any extra surplus
generated by his or her better performance. This problem may be theoretically solved by
the establishment and enforcement of a co-operative solution, in which each employee
agrees to higher work norms (rather than being a ‘free rider’ off the efforts of others) and
all benefit as a result of better performance. What it takes in practice, however, to establish
such a solution and convince employees to participate is not specified by theory, however.
In such a situation, to get higher performance through group incentive schemes ‘something
more may be needed—something akin to developing a corporate culture that emphasizes
company spirit, promotes group co-operation, encourages social enforcement mechanisms,
and so forth’ (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990: 100).
The firm’s decision making structure, other human resource policies, and managerial
approach to workers may be large elements in the ‘something more’ that is needed for
employee ownership to produce better performance. In particular, it is often suggested that
group incentive schemes need to be structured to draw upon additional worker skills and
information about the work process (Applebaum and Berg, 2000). Such skills and
information may become available if there are programmes to encourage employee
involvement in workplace decisions, open new channels both to provide employees with
more information and solicit ideas from employees, and assure workers that any
productivity improvements will not result in layoffs or reduced job security. Such changes
in a workplace may combine with employee-owned stock to help create a sense of
partnership/ownership with higher employee commitment and motivation. There is some
speculation that transferring property rights in the form of residual return rights
(Applebaum and Berg, 2000) and control rights may go someway towards addressing
finding a ‘co-operative’ solution.
2.2 Incentive contract theory and transferring property rights to non-owner
employees
The question asked by incentive contract theory is: why do employees work hard when
their work can not be perfectly monitored, and how can they be motivated to provide
productivity enhancing ideas when they have knowledge of the production process which
management does not have? (Lazear, 1986). There are an infinite number of different
forms and types of incentive contracts which employers can choose from and some have
more efficient outcomes than others. One of the primary reasons these incentive contracts
are necessary is because employees have access to productivity enhancing information.
These questions of how to most effectively monitor and motivate employees are especially
pertinent now because of the greater levels of private information which reside with
employees (Levine and Tyson, 1990). It has long been recognized that information
asymmetries exist in organizations and employees have private information from which
management could benefit. Given the increasing educational attainment, more company
training and information technology, monitoring may be increasingly difficult which
argues for the efficacy of goal aligning incentive systems.
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) indicate that the concept of ownership, combined with
statutory property rights are the fundamental means to provide an incentive to create and5
develop an asset. The two fundamental aspects of ownership include; firstly, the rights of
‘residual rights of control’, which is the right to make decisions concerning the use of an
asset; secondly, the right to ‘residual returns’ which is the right to revenues left over after
all obligations have been met. According to Milgrom and Roberts, it is the combination of
these two rights which provides the individual incentive effects of ownership. The
combination is seen to be the most powerful incentive due to the fact that the person
making the decision bears the financial results of their decision. Milgrom and Roberts also
state that these effects are most efficient when these property rights are ‘transferable’, or
are able to be assigned to the person who is best suited to be in charge. Further developing
the notion of sharing the rights of ownership are Ben-Ner and Jones (1995). Ben-Ner and
Jones develop a theoretical framework which combines these two aspects of ownership,
control and return, and suggest possible firm performance outcomes associated with
transferring these rights from owners to non-owner employees.3 They contend that the
greatest efficiency outcomes exist when both these rights are transferred from owners to
non-owners.
As discussed earlier there are, however, arguments against any productivity effects
associated with group incentive schemes. One of the strongest charges against the
productivity-enhancing effects of group-based incentive schemes is the free rider or 1/n
problem. In addition to the free rider problem there is also the fact that many employees
may be averse to increasing the amount of compensation which they have at risk. The firm
may be in a better position to absorb any risk associated with outside factors affecting
remuneration. The free rider problem has been dealt with largely by relying on arguments
taken from game theory (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990). The argument states that there is a
co-operative and non-co-operative solution associated with group interactions. As people
engage in a repeated game they have a choice to free ride on the efforts of others or to
work together. In the matter of group-based incentives it is the case that when everyone
works together everyone will be better off. Consequently, as the game is repeated those
involved may eventually move towards a co-operative solution.
In their theoretical work Drago and Turnbull (1988) determine that group incentives are
more efficient than individual incentives in team production settings, provided a climate of
‘trust’ and co-operation is developed. It may be that broadly granting equity compensation
such as in the form of broad-based stock options, may signal that ‘we are all in this
together’, which may in turn help develop this culture of co-operation.
There are a number of fundamental changes in the workplace which may be making it
increasingly advantageous for firms to use equity compensation. There is additional
speculation that in settings where monitoring costs are especially high, it may be especially
cost effective to find substitutes for formal monitors. There is some speculation that this
may be especially true in high technology firms where inputs from human capital are
especially important for new product innovations (Core and Qian, 2000). Additionally,
according to Applebaum and Berg (2000) new manufacturing practices are making it
increasingly advantageous to put in place equity compensation.
3 For a more complete explanation regarding the hypothesised productivity effects of control and return
rights see Ben-Ner and Jones (1995).6
3. Incidence, company characteristics, and determinants of share ownership
3.1 Share ownership: incidence
There are a variety of forms that employee ownership can take. Employee ownership is not
a simple, one dimensional concept that permits an easy classification of a firm as
‘employee-owned’ or of an employee as an ‘employee owner.4 A company may be, for
example, 100 per cent owned by only 25 per cent of employees, or only 25 per cent owned
by all employees (with the rest held outside the firm), or 100 per cent owned by all
employees but one person holds a majority of the stock. Four important dimensions of
employee ownership are:
1) the percentage of employees who participate in ownership;
2) the percentage of ownership held within the company by employees;
3) the inequality of ownership stakes among employee owners; and
4) the prerogatives and rights that ownership confers upon employees.
The prerogatives and rights conferred by employee ownership are determined in part by
whether ownership is direct (where employees can freely buy and sell company stock) or
indirect (where stock is held through an employee trust or co-operative), and in part by the
voting rights and other forms of participation accompanying the ownership.
In the United States, the main vehicle for employee ownership is the Employee Stock
Ownership Plan (ESOP), which was first given recognition and special tax treatment as a
form of pension plan in the 1974 ERISA law. There are currently about 6.5 million
participants, representing 6.4 per cent of the private sector workforce, in over 8,700 ESOPs
with combined assets of $223 billion (USA DoL, 1998: 55).
In recent years, the USA, like in many European countries, has established pension saving
schemes that allow employees to invest their money with tax incentives in a basket of
mutual funds for use in their retirement. Oddly enough, these plans, which do not even
have the employee ownership label in their names, are the fastest growing form of direct
employee ownership in the USA today. Apart from ESOPs, there are just over 8 million
participants in non-ESOP defined contribution pension plans that hold employer stock,
which hold a total of $91 billion of employer stock (over 80 per cent in 401(k) plans).5
According to recent data by the National Center for Employee Ownership, 401k plans
cover about 2 million employees and have upwards of $100 billion in employee ownership
assets. Federal tax laws allow workers to contribute pre-tax salary dollars to these plans up
to about $10,000 a year adjusted upwards for inflation (they are not usually set up using
leverage although a combination of the leveraged ESOP and the 401k plan called the
KSOP does exist). It is important to realize that unlike ESOPs, 401k plans are mostly made
up of voluntary worker contributions with some employer matching contributions to give
4 While there is a rich literature associated with other forms of employee ownership such as leveraged
management buy-outs and worker co-operatives our review and analysis is focussed on broad forms of
employee equity ownership associated with shared capitalism.
5 These and the other figures in this paragraph are based on calculations from the Pension and Welfare
Benefits Administration’s Form 5500 data for fiscal year 1994, which are the most recent complete data
available.7
workers an incentive to contribute; these 401k plans are established by employers but
usually managed by workers themselves on the internet through major online brokerages
such as Fidelity, Charles Schwab, Solomon Smith Barney and Merrill Lynch. Employers
typically provide a choice of different investment options that are usually stock, bond,
money market and real estate trust mutual funds offered by the financial services firm that
manages the internet site and the benefit plan. Workers themselves choose between various
kinds of investments and can switch funds back and forth among the investment options.
Employee ownership comes to play a role in 401k plans because one of the investment
options that employees are free to choose or not choose is typically an employer stock
fund. Also, employer matching contributions are often in company stock. About 2000 of
these plans in mainly large publicly-traded companies in 2001 involve employee
ownership of company stock in 2001. For example, a recent study at Rutgers University
found that 40 per cent of 401k plans with more than 5000 workers had the employee
ownership feature with 15 per cent of the savings plans assets invested in employer stock.
Regarding smaller public companies, 20 per cent of 401k plans with 500-1000 workers had
the employee ownership feature with about 6 per cent of the savings plan assets invested in
company stock. About a third of all participating employees in the US were in plans with
the employee ownership feature.
Employees may own stock directly in their companies through stock purchase (or stock
option programmes), which was done by 8.9 per cent of employees in 1983 (Brickley and
Hevert, 1991), or they may own their companies as members of worker co-operatives
(Jones, 1979; Bonin, Jones, and Putterman, 1993). Combining the various methods of
owning employer stock, and roughly adjusting for the fact that in the US many employees
and companies offer multiple plans, about one-fifth of American adults report holding
stock in the company in which they work.6
While a large number of USA employees own employer stock, almost all of this stock is in
firms that are only minority employee-owned. Of USA companies with more than 10
employees, approximately 2000 have a majority of stock owned by their employees.7
Among large public companies, only a few are majority employee-owned (United Airlines
most prominently), but among public companies generally (where the SEC defines a 5 per
cent stockholder as a major stakeholder) almost 1000 have more than 4 per cent of stock
held broadly by employees, with average employee holdings of 12 per cent (Blasi and
Kruse, 1991). There has been substantial growth of public firms with more than 20 per
cent of broad employee ownership (Blair et al., 2000).
Employee ownership has been a developing feature of a number of socialist countries in
transition to greater private ownership. Researchers have investigated the role of various
forms of employee ownership in China (Tseo, 1996), Russia (Blasi, Kroumova and Kruse,
1997), and the countries in central and Eastern Europe (Uvalic and Vaughan-Whitehead,
1997; Smith et al., 1997). Apart from these another 12 countries8 have some form of
6 This is based on a December 1993 Gallup survey and January 1997 Princeton Survey Research Associates
survey, summarized in Kruse and Blasi (1999).
7 Estimate made by Corey Rosen of the National Center for Employee Ownership, Oakland, CA.
8 The countries are Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama,
Peru, and Venezuela.8
constitutional or statutory mandate for profit sharing, although enforcement is unclear and
there are no data on how many workers are covered (Florkowski, 1991).9
3.2 Share ownership: company characteristics
What types of firms adopt employee ownership (where it is not mandated)? At least 16
studies have been done on this question, most of them using cross-sectional data to predict
plan presence but a few using panel data to predict plan adoption (summarized in Kruse,
1993, 1996; also see Blasi and Kruse, 1991; Blair, Kruse and Blasi, 2000; Patibandla and
Chandra, 1998; and del Boca and Cupaiuolo, 1998). Most of the adoption studies however
have been done on samples of firms that had direct forms of employee ownership versus
broad employee stock option plans, so the results may not hold for all forms of ownership
participation in general. Overall, the studies do not support any one dominant explanation
for the adoption of these plans. But these studies do come to one very clear cut conclusion:
the dominant public impression among many scholars and members of the press that
failing firms adopt employee ownership is proven to be without any solid evidence. The
source of this impression apparently has been the substantial media coverage given to high
profile rescues of a handful of weak steel, airline, trucking, and other firms in the USA in
the eighties and early nineties. Employee ownership may be used to substitute for
supervision, which is supported by the results in Patibandla and Chandra (1998); however,
studies are split on whether they are more or less common in capital intensive firms where
employee malfeasance can be more costly. Two studies of ESOPs in public companies in
the USA found wide dispersion among various industries and contradict the assertions of
Hansmann (1996) about the expected diffusion of such plans. (Blasi and Kruse, 1991;
Blair, Kruse, and Blasi, 2000). Both types of plans are more likely to be adopted in large
companies, going against the idea that collective incentives will be more attractive where
there is less of a free rider problem, and suggesting the existence of fixed costs in
establishing these plans.
Concerning a motivation for greater compensation flexibility, two studies found the
adoption and presence employee ownership to be linked to higher variability of company
profits. A desire for flexibility may also be manifested when firms adopt profit sharing or
employee ownership following changes in performance, since these plans may assist firms
in raising or lowering compensation without changing fixed wage levels. Four studies have
found that worse firm performance, and two have found that better firm performance,
predicts the adoption of these plans. Some employers may adopt employee ownership
plans to discourage unionization, hoping that such plans encourage employees to focus on
company performance and identify with employers (accounting in part for unionists'
longstanding uneasy relationship with employee ownership and profit sharing). Studies are,
however, split on whether unionization is higher or lower in firms with employee
ownership. Finally, there may be tax, legal, or other financial concerns that motivate the
adoption of employee ownership. Two advantages of employee ownership plans in the
USA is that they can provide a ready source of accessible capital for firms and help ward
9 The National Center for Employee Ownership has prepared an extensive report on Employee Ownership
Legislation Around The World that is available at http://www.nceo.org/library/aroundtheworld.html; it
includes both an explanation and overview of the legislation itself and a closer look at the situation in each
country—their main website is www.nceo.org.9
off hostile takeovers, although it is not apparent that these are major factors in their
adoption (Kruse, 1996).
In sum, substantial minorities of workers are covered by employee ownership
arrangements in industrialized countries, but disparate findings from prior studies have not
provided clear answers on what factors predict the use of profit sharing and employee
ownership. There have been contradictory findings on even basic variables such as
unionization and capital intensity. One interpretation is that decisions to implement these
plans are largely idiosyncratic, reflecting a large role played by employer discretion and/or
specific workplace cultures and characteristics that are not easily measured. A case can
clearly be made, however, for more research with better measures of factors likely to
influence adoption. In particular, there is a need for more studies using panel data to
predict the adoption decision, which can greatly help sort out heterogeneity and causality
issues. One conclusion is clear, however, the facile assumption many economists and
members of the press and public that failing firms mainly use employee share schemes is
grossly overstated and represents mainly a reaction to popular newspaper and TV
coverage, not research.
3.3 Broad-based stock options plans: incidence
Broad-based stock option plans have been on the rise over the last decade. There is little
detailed case study and econometric research of their impact on company performance.
This review focuses mainly on data about options that were actually granted because there
is a significant gap between this and company reports about how many employees are
theoretically eligible for options. Studies are contained in Weeden, Carberry, and Rodrick
(1998) unless they are separately. Nevertheless, four of these studies, however, sample
important populations of companies and find an increasing use of such plans. First, the
William M. Mercer studies of the proxies of the 350 largest public companies find an
increase in the percent of companies actually granting stock options to all employees from
5.7 per cent in 1993 to 10.3 per cent in 1997. (Mercer 1997; Weeden, Carberry, and
Rodrick 1998: 199) Second, the Center for Effective Organizations of the University of
Southern California did studies of Fortune 1000 firms (279 in 1993 and 212 firms in 1996)
and found that the percentage offering such plans to 100 employees remained at 10 per
cent, but the percentage offering broad plans to more than 20 per cent of employees went
up from 30 per cent to 51 per cent (Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford 1998: 34). Third, the
Arthur Anderson survey of the largest 1250 global corporations found 33 per cent offered
such programmes to all employees and 11 per cent planned to add them in the future.
Finally and fourth, in 1998, the USA Federal Reserve Board economists in 12 regions
surveyed 415 companies in varied industries and found that about a third had broad-based
programmes and 37 per cent had broadened the participation in the last 2 years. Sixty-
seven per cent of companies offered stock options to employees of lower occupational
levels such as managers and professionals.
Other studies offer additional insight on the diffusion of this new form of equity
participation. The Hewitt Associates study of 1200-2000 companies from 1991-7 is the
largest study but does not discriminate between plans that make all or most employees
eligible versus those that actually make grants and it may include some employee share
purchase plans (although it does exclude retirement plans). This is a key distinction since
many corporations actually make most or all of their workers eligible for stock options10
without ever actually giving them to most or all employees year after year. It can be the
source of great inaccuracy. The Share Data study found a four-fold increase in the number
of larger companies that made stock options available to all employees. (Share Data, 1997)
Analyses of the size of firms involved however yield inconsistent results with hi-tech
samples showing a preponderance of smaller firms and more diverse industry samples,
such as the Federal Reserve Board 1998 sample, showing a preponderance of larger
corporations.
While it is tempting to ascribe the rising incidence of these plans to economic
performance, a recent USA Federal Reserve Board study underlines the widely held view
that such plans may be popular because currently generally accepted accounting principles
allow firms to record the expense for these options as zero. This is because they measure
the value of an option by its intrinsic value, that is, the difference between the market price
on the grant data and the exercise price. When firms grant options with a fixed exercise
price equal to or greater than the market price of the grant date (so-called fixed plan
options), the intrinsic value of the option, and thus the recorded expense, is zero (See
Lebow, Sheiner, Slifman, and McCluer, 1999: 4-5). While this extremely favourable
method of accounting has been controversial with the Financial Accounting Standards
Board, institutional investors, and some shareholders, corporations have engaged in
repeated successful struggles with these groups in the 1990s to retain the favourable
practice. As a compromise, since 1997 the Financial Accounting Standard Board Statement
Number 123 required that companies now report the pro forma effect on net income and
earnings per share had they been required to take an accounting charge for the fair market
value of all stock options on the data of grant. A 1998 survey of the largest 200 industrial
and service corporations found that the pro forma negative impact on net income was 3.8
per cent at the mean for 181 of the companies, but the figure was greater than 6 per cent for
13 per cent of the companies and greater than 10 per cent for 13 per cent of the companies
(Pearl Meyer, 1998). We should caution that this is not clearly a study of broad-based
plans and probably focuses mainly on executive or executive and management plans and
simply provides some insight into how the pro forma adjustment affects large corporations
with stock option plans for any category of employee participating.
3.4 Broad-based stock option organizations: company characteristics
In our recent research we find there to be a number of company characteristics which differ
from other similar ‘non-stock option firms’ (Sesil, Kroumova, Blasi and Kruse, 2000a).
We find stock option companies tend to be larger and have higher employment levels than
otherwise similar firms. These firms also have greater levels of sales and capital intensity.
Also they are more likely to be found in manufacturing (includes high-technology firms)
and the service sector. Additionally, in a second paper (Sesil, Kroumova, Blasi and Kruse,
2000b) we compare high technology firms which offer broad-based stock options to high
technology firms which do not in order to evaluate the performance effects. We find
essentially the same company characteristics including the fact that there are significantly
greater R&D expenditures per employee. Within high-technology firms we find that broad-
based stock options are more common in semiconductor and software companies then in
pharmaceutical or high technology manufacturing. Furthermore, we also compare the
usage of these stock options in union and non-union firms (Kroumova, Sesil, Kruse and
Blasi, 2000). Here we found that Unionized firms were 9.4 per cent less likely to have a
stock option plan in 1997. Nevertheless, it should be noted that broad-based stock option11
plans were not uncommon among unionized firms in the USA and have been adopted by a
modest number of such firms. Again, Unionized stock option firms were larger in terms of
both sales and employment levels in 1997.
4. Performance effects
4.1 Share ownership: impact on performance
At least 32 studies in the past 20 years have tackled the question of whether and how
employee ownership affects firm performance. This section briefly summarizes the main
conclusions from a review of 29 of these studies in Kruse and Blasi (1997), plus three
more recent studies (Smith et al., 1997; Ohkusa and Ohtake, 1997; McNabb and Whitfield,
1998).10 Some of these studies are of USA ESOPs only (comparing ESOP and non-ESOP
firms either cross-sectionally, or before and after the adoption of an ESOP), while other
studies look within groups of worker co-operatives attempting to measure the effects of
different co-operative features. The remainder are of other forms or combinations of
employee ownership, using comparisons with non-employee-owned firms and/or
comparisons based on employee ownership features within firms.
As with the evidence on employee attitudes and behaviour under employee ownership, the
studies on firm performance are split between neutral and favourable findings. While the
majority of studies could not reject the null hypothesis of no significant relationship
between employee ownership and performance, our meta-analysis of the ESOP studies
found that we could reject this null hypothesis overall based on the disproportionate
number of positive and significant estimates (79 per cent of the 333 reported coefficients
were positive, and 17 per cent had T-statistics greater than 2). The average estimated
productivity difference between ESOP and non-ESOP firms is 6.2 per cent, and the
average estimated increase in productivity following adoption is 4.4 per cent.
Concerning worker co-operatives, an analysis of the Pacific northwest plywood co-
operatives indicated that they had higher productivity, while the studies analyzing co-
operative features found that three—membership, individual capital stakes, and bonus per
worker—were linked to better firm performance. While most of these studies are of firms
in western industrialized countries, it is worth noting that two studies of employee
ownership in transition economies (Poland and Slovenia) found that firms with employee
ownership had higher productivity (Jones, 1993; Smith et al., 1997).
An important research issue in performance studies is selection bias in the types of firms
and workers that choose employee ownership. Good performance may be a cause, rather
than an effect, of employee ownership, or both may be dependent on other factors within
the firm. The panel studies address the most basic form of selection bias, by controlling for
pre-adoption performance levels. A number of studies have otherwise attempted to adjust
for the potential endogeneity of employee ownership, with little substantive difference in
the results. There are few data on what types of workers choose to work in employee
10 As with the employee attitude studies surveyed above, these studies used systematic data collection
across a large sample of firms (excluding individual case studies), and statistical techniques to control for
other influences upon performance and rule out sampling error.12
ownership companies, but an analysis of workers who became enrolled in a group
incentive scheme found that initially high and low performers were most likely to drop out,
and average worker quality did not change (Weiss, 1987). The estimates appear unlikely to
be biased, therefore, by firm or worker selection issues.
Other important aspects of firm performance are firm survival, growth, and stability. The
theoretical literature on labour management gives no reason to expect that employee
ownership will have positive effects on employment behaviour, and in fact tends to predict
perverse responses to positive demand shocks. It should be noted that the institutional and
decision making structure of most firms with employee ownership is far from that assumed
in the labour-managed firm literature—it is extremely rare to have all employees
participate both in ownership and in company decisions on a one person/one vote basis.
Nonetheless it is possible that employee owners will exert formal or informal pressure on
managers to make employment decisions as predicted by the labour-managed firm
literature.
Several studies have looked at employment behaviour and survival of employee ownership
firms. The one study focusing on the predictions of the labour-managed firm literature
examined USA plywood co-operatives, comparing their employment behaviour to that of
conventional plywood firms (Craig and Pencavel, 1992, 1993). There was no perverse
employment response to demand shocks among the co-operatives; rather, co-operatives
appeared to be inclined to put a large weight on employment, adjusting pay rather than
employment as demand changes.
Another study analyzed USA public companies with broad-based employee ownership
plans holding more than 17 per cent of company stock as of 1983 (Blair et al., 2000).
These companies also appeared to put a greater weight on employment than conventional
companies, given that they were more likely than comparable public companies to survive
until 1995, and had significantly lower variability of employment (both among the
survivors and non-survivors). The employment stability did not, however, appear to come
at the expense of firm efficiency, given that the stock market performance of the employee
ownership firms was slightly better than that of other firms.
The employee ownership companies in this study did not, however, have faster
employment growth than other public companies, in contrast to the results of two other
studies comparing employment growth before and after the adoption of ESOPs (Quarrey
and Rosen, 1993; Winther and Marens, 1997). These studies found that employment
growth was faster after ESOP adoption, particularly among firms that had greater levels of
employee participation in decision making.
Finally, the survival of French worker co-operatives was examined in Estrin and Jones
(1992). Contrary to predictions that co-operatives will either fail or degenerate into
capitalist firms as workers are hired, they found a high rate of survival and no evidence of
degeneration, although the financial structures may have become increasingly inefficient
over time.13
4.2 Broad-based stock options: impact on performance
The financial impact of these plans has been mainly evaluated in relation to their impact on
outside shareholders. Four studies have estimated the percent of market value represented
by all outstanding options. In the late nineties, the percent of dilution ranges from 5.5 per
cent at the median to 17.4 per cent with the higher estimates consistently coming from high
technology company surveys, although a recent 1998 National Center for Employee
Ownership study found the average dilution to by 12.6 per cent with a third of the
companies above 15 per cent. Another 1998 study of the 200 largest industrial and service
corporations put the average at about 13.2 per cent for all options outstanding for all equity
programmes except stock purchase plans and ESOPs although it is unclear if this study
includes only broad-based stock option plans (Pearl Meyer, 1998). The largest study
available deals with the top 1500 Standard & Poors corporations but it considers both stock
option and other stock plans. One analysis of this data found that overhang (i.e. potential
dilution from all options outstanding) dramatically increased from 5 per cent to 13 per cent
from 1988 to 1997. This study concludes that companies with an overhang of 10.6 per cent
(close to the ceiling of 10 per cent publicly announced by many institutional investors)
have median total shareholder return that is significantly greater than the highest third of
companies with overhang of 18.7 per cent However, high technology companies have
higher overhang than other industries, they have faster five year sales growth, and they can
tolerate a higher overhang (16 per cent) without hurting total shareholder return (Watson
Wyatt Worldwide 1998 ; Investor Responsibility Research Center 1997). Given that most
institutional investors object to dilution potential above 10 per cent, it is clear that broad-
based stock options could potentially represent a significant drain on total shareholder
return. Indeed, there appears to be a brewing conflict with outside shareholders over
options in general. According to Watson Wyatt Worldwide, the average overhang among
major companies hit 13 per cent in 1997, up from 5 per cent in 1988.
Moreover, four studies have examined repricing of options where corporations change the
option strike price after it becomes clear to them that their employees will not reap any
financial benefit because the share price is not increasing as rapidly as they originally had
hoped. These studies show that 15-36 per cent of companies reprice their options with 36
per cent engaging in repricing in the latest 1998 study. Repricing is yet another area where
government regulators are changing their views about equity compensation trends. The
USA Securities and Exchange Commission changed its long standing position in 1998 and
required General DataComm Industries Inc. to include a resolution by an institutional
investor (the State of Wisconsin Investment Board) for a binding shareholder vote for prior
shareholder approval of repricing. In the past the SEC viewed such practices as matters of
ordinary business operations to be governed by boards and not open to shareholder
decision making. (Pearl Meyer, 1998: 15). Among 20 very large companies with broad-
based plans, their average commitment of common shares outstanding is 3.4 per cent.
Three of these companies have adopted an evergreen provision for stock option share
authorization whereby 1 per cent of their shares is automatically added to the stock option
pool annually (Hewitt Associates 1997: 24). The key question about the dilution issue is
whether broad-based stock option plan’s dilution effect is greater than their incentive effect
on total shareholder return or not.
In our three papers we evaluate the impact of broad-based stock options on the
performance of firms. As discussed earlier, we conduct this analysis broadly across the14
economy, in high-technology firms and in union and non-union firms. We discovered, in
general, in all these settings, firms which granted BBSO to its employees had better
performance outcomes than otherwise similar firms which did not grant options broadly to
its employees.
We also find firms which broadly grant stock options to all employees are performing
better in a given year. In 1997, we find that in the full sample (Sesil, et al., 2000a) BBSO
firms have higher levels of labour productivity, return on assets, Tobin’s q, and total
shareholder returns. Both restricted samples of high-technology (Sesil, et al., 2000b) and
union BBSO firms (Kroumova, et al., 2000) exhibit the same better performance in 1997.
Additionally, during 1992-7 these firms were also faster growing in terms of employment,
sales and in many of the performance outcomes. We also find that firms which broadly
grant stock options exhibited total shareholder returns which were considerably better then
the market as a whole.11
While we evaluated a number of market- accounting- and output based measures, we found
consistent evidence that productivity was higher in firms which offered broad-based stock
options. We also found that after the introduction of broad-based stock options the market
responded by significantly increasing the perceived value of the firm’s intangible assets.
These results continue to hold up in before-and-after comparisons and within-company
performance when looking at labour productivity.
We found essentially the same performance outcomes when we look at high technology
firms. However, in addition to better labour productivity we also find some evidence of
greater levels of new idea generation as measured by patent applications. While there is
also evidence that ‘non’ BBSO firms also have a high level of new product innovation, we
cannot be entirely sure that these firms we determine to be non-BBSO firms are actually in
this category. BBSO have become the norm in so many high-technology firms that it is
likely that there is some measurement error associated with our ‘non’ stock option pair.
Consequently, there may be a downward bias in our coefficients.
Additionally, we find in unionized firms that there to be considerably higher labour
productivity and performance in firms where there are broadly dispersed stock options. We
find unionized stock option firms have approximately 30 per cent higher labour
productivity than non-union non-stock option companies. We find that when a before-and-
after analysis is conducted we see significantly higher labour productivity and market
value over replacement costs in unionized stock option firms.
5. Impact on employee attitudes and wages
How does employee ownership affect employee attitudes and behaviour? While this
section will review mainly research studies, there is no question that the most relevant
conclusion from surveys in the US is that employees feel quite positive about employee
ownership. Recently, a review of over two decades of public opinion polls and surveys on
this issue, Public Opinion Polls on Employee Ownership and Profit Sharing (Kruse and
11 These descriptive statistics do not control for either omitted variable bias or reverse causality. These
issues are addressed in the performance effects section of this paper.15
Blasi, 1999) indicates strong public support for the ideas and the practices. Employee
ownership may have positive effects if employees value ownership in itself or perceive that
it brings greater income, job security, or control over jobs and the workplace. On the other
hand, it may have negligible or even negative effects if employees perceive no difference
in their worklives, dislike the extra risk to their income or wealth, or have raised
expectations that are not fulfilled.
There have been over two dozen published studies on employee attitudes and behaviour
under employee ownership in the past two decades.12 This section summarizes the key
conclusions from a review of 26 of these studies (Kruse and Blasi, 1997), along with the
results from three other studies (Grunberg et al., 1996; Keef, 1998; Pendleton et al., 1998).
Most of the studies have made cross sectional comparisons between employee owners and
non-owners (who may be in the same firm or in different firms), while a few have made
longitudinal comparisons before and after the adoption or termination of employee
ownership, and others have looked within groups of employee owners to see how attitudes
are related to different plan features or employee characteristics. The studies surveyed here
each addressed a number of topics, including: employee satisfaction (analyzed in 10
studies); organizational commitment/identification (12 studies); employee motivation
(6 studies); attitudes toward union (3 studies); perceived and desired employee
participation/influence in decisions (11 studies); satisfaction with an ESOP (2 studies); and
behavioural measures such as turnover, absenteeism, grievances, tardiness, and injuries
(6 studies).
The first conclusion from reviewing these studies is that there is no automatic
improvement of attitudes and behaviour associated with being simply an employee owner.
Some studies find higher satisfaction, commitment, and motivation among employee
owners, but others find no significant differences between owners and non-owners, or
before and after an employee buyout.
Second, where there are significant differences associated with employee ownership, they
almost always show better attitudes and behaviour under employee ownership. Most of the
studies of organizational commitment and identification find that they are higher under
employee ownership, while the studies are mixed between favourable and neutral findings
on job satisfaction, motivation, and behavioural measures.13 It is rare to find worse
attitudes and behaviour under employee ownership; only one study found lower
satisfaction among employee owners compared to a nationwide sample, but this was in an
ESOP company where the union had lost a bitter strike the year before.14
12 The studies were selected based upon the criteria that they used systematic data collection from
representative samples of employees, and that they used statistical techniques to rule out sampling error.
Many but not all of the studies used multivariate analysis to hold constant the effect of other salient variables
on employee attitudes or behaviour.
13 The behaviours studied include turnover, absenteeism, grievances, tardiness, and injuries.
14 Reminders by management that the strike would hurt ESOP account values brought the response ‘We
don't vote; we don't control the company; we don't care’ (Kruse, 1984).16
Third, while several studies find improved attitudes under employee ownership, this is
almost always due to the status of being an employee owner, rather than to the size of one's
ownership stake.
Fourth, a number of studies find that attitudes and behaviour are positively linked to
greater perceived or actual participation/influence in decisions. Increasing employee
participation and influence makes greater use of employee skills and knowledge, and may
be an important complement of employee ownership that can improve attitudes and
performance. It should be noted, however, that these studies could not definitely establish
causality: better attitudes and behaviour may lead to higher perceived or actual
participation, or the two may reflect similar orientations to the company. The importance
of participation is indicated by the finding of Pendleton et al. (1998) that opportunities for
participation in decision making were more important than ownership per se in generating
feelings of ownership.
Fifth, despite the possible benefits from increased participation in decisions, there is no
automatic connection between employee ownership and either perceived or desired
employee participation. The decision making in a large number of employee ownership
firms is no different than in conventional firms. This suggests that many firms with
employee ownership are not doing enough to develop a corporate culture and employee
empowerment mechanisms that can positively complement employee ownership.
Finally, while some unions have resisted employee ownership out of concern that it may
divide worker loyalties or make the union appear obsolete, there is no evidence of
decreased need or desire for union representation in employee ownership firms (shown in
part by strikes that have occurred at employee-owned firms).
Do employees sacrifice other pay and benefits for a share in ownership, or do these purely
add to worker income and wealth? In contrast to the employee attitude and firm
performance literatures, there have been few studies here.
There were a number of cases in the early 1980’s in which unionized employees accepted
employee ownership or profit-sharing in exchange for concessions in pay or benefits (Bell
and Neumark, 1993). In addition, some employees have taken lower wages as part of
employee buy-outs, such as occurred in the United Airlines case. Generally, however,
workers in employee ownership plans do not appear to have lower average wages or
compensation. In Blasi et al. (1996) we examined public companies in which broad-based
employee ownership plans held at least 5 per cent of company stock as of 1990, making
those major stakeholders according to SEC definitions. The companies with such an
employee ownership stake had 8 per cent higher average compensation levels than other
comparable public companies, and compensation increased with the percentage of stock
held by employees. Compensation growth from 1980 to 1990, however, was no different
between the two types of companies. A closer examination of pay and benefits in ESOP
and non-ESOP firms was made by Kardas et al. (1998), who found that ESOPs appear to
add to worker pay—coming on top of (rather than at the expense of) regular pay and other
benefits. ESOPs also appear to add to pension wealth, coming on top of other pension
assets, but do not appear to affect the distribution of pay within firms.17
In sum, while some employees have accepted lower compensation in exchange for
employee ownership and/or profit sharing in some situations (such as in concessionary
situations), the overall average pay of workers in these plans appears to be at least as high
as, and is probably higher than, that of other workers. However, we underline one more
time that trading existing pay and benefits for stock is not the main mechanism explaining
the receipt of employee ownership or broad based options in the USA today or over the last
two decades. The findings on the larger overall average pay of workers in such plans may
partly reflect higher average productivity levels in employee ownership and profit sharing
companies (representing a compensating differential for greater expected effort) or the use
of efficiency wages in combination with employee ownership and profit sharing to
motivate workers. While limited data indicates that ESOPs add to pension wealth, there
has been no research on how employee ownership and profit sharing relate to overall
wealth of individuals.
There is very little research currently associated with employee attitudes and the use of
broad-based stock options. In one of our papers we evaluate the compensation levels and
growth in broad-based stock option companies; we find that these firms pay higher prior to
the introduction of stock options and continue to pay better after their introduction (Sesil et
al., 2000a). This is counter to the notion that the firm may use stock options as a substitute
for fixed wages. This is similar to the finding associated with profit-sharing firms which
also pay higher prior to introduction of profit-sharing plans and continue to do so after
their introduction (Kruse, 1993).
6. Conclusion
Several broad conclusions from this review are that:
· Employee equity stakes do not magically and automatically improve employee
attitudes, behaviour, and firm performance whenever they are implemented.
· While there are a number of findings that employee attitudes, behaviour, and firm
performance are either improved or unaffected by employee ownership, it is rare to
find worse attitudes or performance under employee ownership.
· Employee ownership is linked to 4-5 per cent higher productivity on average, although
the dispersion of performance outcomes is just as great as among other firms.
· Employment stability and firm survival may be enhanced by employee ownership.
· Pay is higher among employee owners.
These conclusions fly in the face of both very rosy views and very unfavourable views of
employee ownership. While the numerous studies have yielded important insights, they do
not permit an easy answer to the question of whether employee ownership and broad-based
stock option plans are fundamentally good or bad for workers and firms. Based on the
accumulated evidence, it is very likely that employee ownership has improved the
workplace environment and performance in many firms, and many workers have benefited
from greater pay, firm survival, and employment stability. It is also clear that employee18
ownership makes little difference in many workplaces, and in a few cases have
undoubtedly exposed workers to significant financial risk.
Why does employee ownership appear to sometimes have a good effect, but often have no
effect? Some studies have tried to track the organizational mechanisms that may lead to
better outcomes under employee ownership, such as by examining the role of employee
participation in decisions that can create a greater sense of partnership and ownership. A
few studies do show positive interactions with worker participation in decisions—
particularly with improved employee attitudes and employment growth under employee
ownership—although others do not find a connection.
At a minimum, the results indicate that substantial expansion of employee ownership and
broad-based stock options is very unlikely to hurt, and may well enhance, economic
outcomes for workers, firms, and economies. Given that existing studies show that
employee ownership may have significant potential to improve economic well being, what
new research should be done? The few studies on employment stability, growth, and firm
survival have provided tantalizing indications that employee ownership may add to job
security without sacrificing firm performance. There clearly should be more research in
this area, given growing concerns about economic insecurity due to international trade,
technological change, and capital mobility.
A valuable complement to the above research would be more study of pay levels and
trends among workers in employee ownership and broad-based stock option companies, to
examine why pay levels appear to be higher in such companies, and the extent to which
worker pay and wealth may trade off against employment security and other outcomes.
Regarding employee attitudes, behaviours, and firm performance, new data and measures
are needed to make sense of previous dispersed findings by identifying the organizational
mechanisms through which employee ownership has an effect. The disparate measures of
employee participation that have been used have not produced a clear answer, indicating
measurement problems and/or the importance of other workplace policies and
characteristics. Intensive case studies may be a valuable prelude to development of better
measures. In addition (apart from such case studies), the era of cross-sectional studies on
these topics is basically past: new studies should be based on panel data from samples that
are as representative as possible, in order to be more certain of causality, examine trends,
and be more confident about generalizing. Such research can provide insights into whether
employee equity stakes will necessarily cover only a minority of firms and workers, or
alternatively, have significant potential to become more widespread.
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